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Non-protected Labour in one West African Capital: Characteristics of 
Jobs and Occupational Mobility in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire 
 
 
Yvan Guichaoua1* 
 
 
 
The microeconomic analysis of labour mobilisation and labour relationships in 
developing countries, though diverse in its hypotheses, methods and results, still 
nurtures the idea of dualistically segmented labour markets. This binary rural/urban 
segmentation leaves in the dark an important stratum of developing countries’ labour 
markets, namely the urban informal sector. How does this huge group of unprotected 
workers gain access to jobs? Do labour relations comprise a social security 
dimension? We focus on the contractual forms that unregistered employment 
relationships take. We successively explore the content of employment relationships 
and compare it to existing classifications. We also assess the role of friends and 
families in accessing jobs and the changing social embeddedness over time of labour 
arrangements to highlight the crucial importance of interpersonal ties for informal 
work trajectories. 
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Introduction 
 
The microeconomic analysis of labour mobilisation and labour relationships in 
developing countries has generated a series of models which clearly differentiate 
behaviour presumably prevailing in urban settings from those presumably prevailing in 
rural ones. Rural economics has focused extensively on land tenancy contracts, bonded 
labour and risk-sharing arrangements (in which the exchange of “free” labour services 
can be categorised, see Stiglitz, J.E. (1988), Bhaduri, A. (1973), Bardhan, P. (1989), 
Coate, S. and M. Ravallion. (1993), Townsend, R.M. (1995)). Urban economics has 
concentrated on explanations for the existence of non-competing groups - either 
imposed by law or endogenously induced by firms - in the big private or state-owned 
industry (Rosenzweig, M.R. (1988), Behrman, J.R. (1999)). Though diverse in its 
hypotheses, methods and results, this body of rural and urban theoretical literature still 
nurtures the old idea of dualistically segmented labour markets. Symptomatically, the 
recent burgeoning literature on risk-mitigation arrangements has, to my knowledge, 
tended to consider cities as lawless areas, where traditional authority could no longer be 
exerted and opportunism would be pervasive2. This statement seems to be grounded on 
fuzzy empirical evidence (Morduch, J. (1999)). Surprisingly this binary rural/urban 
segmentation leaves in the dark an important stratum of developing countries’ labour 
markets that no development practitioner can afford to ignore, namely the urban 
informal sector. Whatever the trickiness of methodological and definitional issues the 
concept raises (Mead, D.C. and C. Morrisson. (1996)), the urban informal sector is a 
reality that mainstream economics largely neglects3.  
 
This is hard to explain. To take the West African context, the informal sector is by far 
the most important urban employer (Brilleau, A., F. Roubaud, and C. Torelli. (2005)). 
How are the processes of access and mobility of this huge group of unprotected 
workers instituted? At a macro level, social dynamics, social security and social 
stability cannot be understood without inquiring what is at stake in a developing 
nation’s informal sector. To illustrate the point, Côte d’Ivoire’s informal sector has, 
over the past decades, successively absorbed various strata of its population: rural 
migrants, middle class workers dismissed by their companies during the economic crisis 
in the 80s and, more recently, educated youths unable to find jobs in the formal sector.  
 
In this paper, we propose to focus on the contractual forms that unregistered 
employment relationships may take. We will exclude self-employment despite the fact 
that it constitutes the main pathway to livelihoods in the informal sector. The reason for 
this is that we want to concentrate our attention on the early stages of informal 
occupational trajectories. Section 1 discusses the classification used by traditional 
employment surveys to characterise unregistered labour. Section 2 proposes an 

2
 Some works of urban sociology focusing on the ecological properties of cities favouring criminal 
behaviours might have nurtured this perception (seeHerpin, N. and H. Lagrange. (2005)).
3
 In the Handbook of Development Economics, M. Rosenzweig states that “an informed reader will see 
that most of the features of the low-income-country urban environment described also characterize urban 
areas of high-income countries. And the issues of the impact of governmental labor market interventions 
and trade unions and the determinants and consequences of job search strategies, which appear to be 
particularly pertinent to such settings, form an important part of the core of modern labor economics. Few 
distinct analytical models specifically targeted in any meaningful way to problems of low-income country 
urban labor markets have emerged in the literature” (Rosenzweig, M.R. (1988), pp. 713-62., p. 755). Ten 
years later, in the Handbook of Labor Economics, Behrman maintains this view: “a decade later, this 
conclusion still holds” (Behrman, J.R. (1999), pp. 2859-939., p. 2916). 
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alternative typology, rendering the normative content of informal labour relations more 
visible. Section 3 measures the role of social ties in favouring job access. Section 4 
attempts to identify the profiles of occupational trajectories and to articulate them to the 
availability of agents’ social connections. Section 5 concludes. 
  
 
I. The standard ILO classification of employment relationships and its implicit 
micro content 
 
Here we try to clarify the implicit micro-rules of employment relationships encapsulated 
in the standard labour classification in order to enable us, in the following section, to 
assess its adequacy to our observations of informal arrangements. The categorisation of 
informal dependent labour in employment surveys carried out in West Africa generally 
rests on the trinity of “apprentice/family worker/salaried worker” (Lachaud, J.-P. 
(1994)). This categorisation used by practitioners, though not completely complying 
with the International Labour Office definitions, derives its popularity from a standard 
statistical classification of labour, which has been formalised in the Resolution on 
International Classification on Status in Employment (ICSE in the remainder of this 
paper) issued by the XVth International Conference of Labour Statisticians in 1993 
(ILO. (1993)).  
 
According to the XVth International Conference of Labour Statisticians, national 
surveys must distribute the labour force into the following mutually exclusive 
categories: “employees, employers, own-account workers, members of producers’ 
cooperatives, contributing family workers, workers not classifiable by status”. The 
building block of this classification is the differentiation between self-employment and 
“paid employment” and, secondarily, the social distance between paid protected 
employment and other forms of dependent labour. The main labour revenues of self-
employed workers depend on the firm’s activity while employees’ earnings remain 
unaffected by the firm’s performance. Profit-sharing schemes can only complement the 
main stream of fixed pay.  
 
The ICSE identifies several sub-groups among the employees. The “salaried workers” 
of standard employment surveys should be classified as employees. They should be 
considered as “regular employees” “for whom the employing organization is 
responsible for payment of relevant taxes and social security contributions and/or where 
the contractual relationship is subject to national labour legislation” (Paragraph 8.1.). 
This forms the most protected employment relationship. Importantly here, the only 
legitimate provider of social security is the State. The Conference doesn’t mention any 
other possible income or consumption smoothing scheme whether private, formal or 
informal that could be associated with non state-protected employment. Regular 
employment is the reference around which others categories of “paid employment” are 
constructed. These are “employees with stable contracts”, “casual workers”, and 
“seasonal workers”. They differ according to their respective contractual length, as 
shown in table 1. 
 
How should apprentices be classified? The ICSE answers: “according to national 
circumstances countries may decide to classify as apprentices or trainees, workers who 
hold explicit or implicit contracts of "paid employment" which specify that all or part of 
their remuneration should be in the form of training for a trade or profession. When 
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identifying apprentice and trainee employees separately, countries may also need and be 
able to distinguish between those who hold a formal training contract and follow a 
formal programme combining work experience with practical and theoretical 
instruction, and those who do not” (Paragraph 14.m). An apprentice is thus an 
employee, theoretically paid but whose earnings can be retained as a compensation for 
costs incurred by training. This definition seems to correspond to a Beckerian rationale 
(Becker, G.S. (1964); see also Velenchik, A.D. (1995)) for an application to developing 
countries) where the comparison between the productivity of trainees and the costs of 
their apprenticeship (e.g. foregone earnings, provision of pedagogical material etc.), and 
the degree of specificity of the human capital transmitted decide what needs to be paid 
by the employer to the apprentice. But do all “apprenticeship” arrangements follow this 
formal logic? Empirical evidence in the West African context, as shown below, casts 
doubt on the legitimacy of equating “apprentices” (in the sense prescribed by the ICSE) 
to the self-declared “apprentices” of the standard employment surveys, especially when 
no teaching plan is implemented and no widely recognised diploma is delivered at 
apprenticeship’s completion. 
 
Finally, in which category should “family workers” appear? Surprisingly, the ICSE 
considers them as self-employed, just like own-account workers or members of 
producers’ cooperatives. Indeed, their remuneration depends on the enterprise’s 
performance. The ICSE states that “contributing family workers are those workers who 
hold a 'self-employment' job […] in a market-oriented establishment operated by a 
related person living in the same household, who cannot be regarded as partners, 
because their degree of commitment to the operation of the establishment, in terms of 
working time or other factors to be determined by national circumstances, is not at a 
level comparable to that of the head of the establishment” (paragraph 12.5). Our field 
research in Côte d’Ivoire suggests that this definition gives a much sanitised image of 
family labour: children are granted an identical theoretical decision weight as their 
parents. The only difference lies in their respective involvement in the business. The 
ICSE understates the discretionary power that a parent has on the allocation of time of 
his/her children. The relationship of subordination that prevails within the family is 
absent from the official classification.  
 
By constructing its typology of employment relationships around the reference to state-
guaranteed protection, the ICSE ignores the possibility that labour relations could be 
built on alternative organisational models. In the mid 80s, Morice, A. (1987), 
commenting on the applicability of earlier versions of this typology to the informal 
sector, insisted that “these categories are categories of law precisely where law doesn’t 
hold […] and where affiliations are multiple” (p. 56, our translation). What could these 
alternative affiliations be? Could other organisational models of labour mobilisation be 
envisaged, i.e. labour regimes carrying their own set of behavioural rules? The family, 
at least, should be one arena of rules. The complexity of intra-family arrangements is 
amalgamated by the ICSE into mere business partnership relations. Ignoring the 
family’s role in a realm of economic interactions from which the formal State is absent 
is likely to be a mistake.  
 
As part of the discussion on organisational models to which labour relationships could 
be attached, it is necessary to evoke a particular dimension of employer-employee 
interactions - totally ignored by the ICSE - that is of great importance in the context of 
the informal sector. This dimension is the form taken by the remuneration of labour. No 
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difference is made by the ICSE between monetary and in kind transfers. Rewarding a 
service in one form or another cannot be commensurate in practice. Intuitively, being 
paid in the form of a redeployable asset, like money, offers more liberty than being 
offered a roof, or a meal. There is evidence to suspect that in-kind remuneration – that is 
difficult to be accurately quantified and valued - is more frequent in a context of an 
asymmetrical personal relation spread over time (e.g. a paternalistic or patron-client tie) 
while monetary transfers characterise short term transactions where reciprocal 
obligations disappear once the job is done. Anthropological and economic literature 
confirms that in-kind transfers carry a “social control” dimension, for the obvious 
reason that the use of the object transferred is constrained. The object in the transaction 
may not be easily alienated or stored. Its recipient is handicapped in using it to mediate 
exchange or as a reserve of value. For the donor, the rationale behind tied transfers may 
either be “political” or “altruistic/paternalistic”. The former interpretation, based on an 
analysis of domestic labour in affluent Indian households, has been put forward by 
Tellis-Nayak, V. (1983) who reasons that paying in-kind is a way to maintain the 
chronic illiquidity of dependent labourers and consequently artificially restrict their 
social mobility. The altruistic/paternalistic interpretation (Pollak, R.A. (1988); Thurow, 
L.C. (1974)) – although it violates the principle of methodological individualism - 
qualifies the political interpretation by arguing that a tied transfer is decided in 
situations where the donor judges that the recipient is not able to appreciate what is 
good for him/her. According to that series of models, certain persons, particularly 
children, but also, sometimes, the entire nation or populations, are denied their 
“consumer sovereignty” due to their lack of competence in specific domains of 
decision-making. This behaviour is also expected to bias the preferences of the 
recipients in a collectively desirable direction. Both the political and 
altruistic/paternalistic versions of tied transfers highlight the key point that tied transfers 
reflect a particular set-up of relationships between the donor and the recipient which is 
chronologically anterior to the act of transferring any object. In this set-up, the 
preferences of the donor systematically dominate the preferences of the recipient. An 
asymmetrical relation is likely to operate here which the local rules of labour 
remuneration reveal. 
 
The ICSE fails to consider alternative organisational models of labour relationships at 
play when the State guarantee doesn’t operate. It disregards, for example, the 
discretionary labour mobilisation of workers in situations of strong personal 
dependence. Furthermore, it views apprenticeship through a formal Beckerian lens that 
is, as the next section will show, not compatible with the practices observed in the 
informal sector of Côte d’Ivoire. 
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Sub-groups of employees Length of contract Official affiliation to social security 
Regular employees indifferent yes 
Employees with stable 
contracts « long »* indifferent 
Casual workers « short »* indifferent 
Seasonal workers « short and 
cyclical » indifferent 
* the appreciation of « long » and « short » employment relationships depends on “national 
circumstances”. Source : ILO. (1993) 
QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS132 

6 
 
 
I. Micro aspects of informal employment relationships in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire 
 
The structure and dynamics of informal employment in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
The recent development trajectory of Côte d’Ivoire is very similar to that experienced 
by many Sub-Saharan countries. One of its major features is the progressive 
“informalisation” of its labour market (Vandemoortele, J. (1991)). In the early 80s, the 
conjunction of the collapse of international prices for primary products (cocoa and 
coffee) and the exhaustion of a rentier accumulation regime has led Côte d’Ivoire into a 
deep economic crisis (Schneider, H. (1992)). SAPs have been implemented that have 
triggered an important downsizing process in the formal public or private sector. Table 
A.1. in the appendix indicates that protected employment has been hard hit in the past 
decades in every sector of the economy, excepting the chemical industry sector. 
Construction and public works have witnessed the most dramatic decline in 
employment by losing 90 per cent of their jobs. Most of this labour force has, however, 
been able to re-gain employment in the informal sector. According to Gaufryau, B. and 
C. Maldonado. (1997), the annual average growth rate of the informal labour force in 
Côte d’Ivoire was 7 per cent between 1975 and 1980, 4.8 per cent between 1980 and 
1985 and 5.7 per cent between 1985 and 1990. Though mostly composed of self-
employed people, the informal labour force has a non negligible young dependent 
component on which the following empirical analysis focuses.  
 
The survey 
 
Here, we use a survey conducted in 1998 in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, designed to detail 
the contents of unregistered employment relationships. Two branches of activities have 
been reviewed: the construction and small garment industries. Due to the absence of any 
sampling base for informal production units, production sites have been selected around 
the economic centres of Abidjan’s ten “communes”. Twenty-five construction sites and 
thirty-one workshops were visited. All the workers present the day of the visit were 
interviewed. Two hundred and twenty-seven workers answered a questionnaire, roughly 
equally distributed between the construction and garment industries. No female 
employee works in the construction sector but genders are roughly equally represented 
in the garment sector. Our expectation consisted of being able to elaborate a prejudice-
free typology of labour relationships by collecting as many details as possible about the 
nature of material and non-material (human capital) transfers between employees and 
employers. As our sample cannot be said to be representative, the main interest of our 
survey does not reside in the number of categories identified but in their content.  
 
A tentative inductive classification of labour relationships 
 
A simple objective measurable criterion, i.e. the monetisation of the employer/employee 
tie, largely justified by discussion above on the form that labour remuneration takes, has 
been used to demarcate three types of labour arrangements: some workers are paid a 
fixed, predetermined and significant rate to execute codified tasks; some workers 
themselves pay a fixed amount in order to accomplish an “apprenticeship”, and, finally, 
some workers neither pay nor receive any money for working. We call the first 
arrangement “paid labour”, the second “monetised apprenticeship” (or simply 
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“apprenticeship” in the remainder of this text), and the last “unpaid labour”. Paid 
workers receive a sum at least superior to FCFA 5004 a day and apprentices either pay a 
bulk sum exceeding FCFA 2000 or regularly transfer a greater than zero payment. By 
definition, our third class is a residual one. No obvious rule permits us to characterise it 
yet. This uncertainty will fade with the further analysis proposed. Table 2 indicates the 
size of each of the classes of workers.  
 
 

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Types of labour arrangement freq. Written contracts 
Explicitly monetised remuneration 119 3 
    daily payment 94* 2 
    monthly payment 16* 1 
    piecework 11* 0 
Monetised apprenticeship 60 5 
Non monetised labour 47 2 
* Non-exclusive categories 
 
 
Apprentices and unpaid workers are mainly found in the workshops while paid workers 
are in the construction sector5 (see table A.2. in the appendix). We now turn to a more 
detail specification of each of the categories. The construction sector is exclusively 
composed of male workers. Female workers are thus concentrated in the textile sector 
and, as a result, are either unpaid workers or fee-paying apprentices. Remarkably, the 
fee-paying arrangement is highly biased toward women. Guichaoua, Y. (2003) explores 
the reasons why this should be the case. 

• Paid labour : unprotected standardised labour transactions 
Paid labour contracts have a short lifespan; three months is the maximum length we 
have observed. Table A.3. in the Appendix measures the average daily or monthly pay 
of paid workers by the complexity of the tasks they perform. Complex tasks in masonry 
imply at least piling and aligning bricks. In garment workshops, complex tasks include 
a minima the cutting of clothes. Almost no paid tailor is unqualified. Daily workers’ pay 
obeys codified rules. At the time of the survey, unqualified workers (i.e. performing 
simple tasks) were remunerated at FCFA 1500 a day and their qualified colleagues 
(those performing complex tasks) around FCFA 2500 a day. Clearly, what is being 
remunerated in the construction industry is the role played in the division of labour, not 
the person who enacts it.  
 
Do paid workers receive any complementary benefits transferred by their employer? 
Table A.4. in the Appendix neatly provides a negative answer despite the existence of 
some cases of daily allowances for lunch. Assistance in the case of disease or accident 
at work is also reported to be promised by their boss to one paid worker out of five. 
However, this figure shouldn’t be overestimated: a promise is not an act and, more 
importantly, this expectation generally emanates from workers whose employer is also a 
relative. No assistance is thus contractually established. When it exists, it largely derives 

4
 1000 FCFA= 1.5.
5
 The small textile industry thus extensively relies on « free » or even “remunerating” labour.
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from the pre-existing social relationship between the parties. It then cannot be attached 
to the current labour transaction per se. Confirming this argument, the maintenance of 
safety at work is not claimed as being part of an employer’s duties. When assistance is 
effectively granted, it merely reveals the “generosity” of the employer. Like 
remunerations, the working conditions of paid labourers are rather uniform (see table 
A.5. in the Appendix).  
 
To conclude on paid labour, most arrangements conform to the model of spot 
transactions comprising monetary transfers and few other characteristics. Norms of 
payments or labour conditions are determined by the particular job to be performed; 
they do not stem from any individual bargaining. This standardised model of labour 
transactions is not particularly surprising as most of paid workers in our sample operate 
in a construction sector which is universally notorious for its cost externalisation 
practices, notably via long chains of subcontracting (Assaad, R. (1993); Evers, H.-D. 
(1989); Stretton, A. (1979)). What is at stake here however is not the understanding of 
the labour relationship itself but the long term individual sustainability of such a modus 
operandi. Paid labour ensures sufficient earnings if and only if workers are offered 
contracts on a continuous basis. What characterises the paid labour force is its chronic 
vulnerability6. As savings are not an immediate solution due to credit market 
imperfections, we hypothesise that long-lasting subsistence in these conditions is only 
feasible if dependent paid workers benefit from consumption smoothing arrangements 
that are exterior to their respective employment arrangement. Who then provides this 
protection is thus the question which needs to be answered. 
 
• Costly apprenticeship 
The second category of labour we have identified comprises workers who declare 
themselves as apprentices and pay a significant amount to their employer to receive 
technical training. The promise of the transmission of skills is here explicit, though 
rarely written. The amount paid by apprentices to their boss at the moment of the survey 
averages to FCFA 65,000 which immediately suggest that apprentices have to find 
external financial support. If we consider that a “normal” training lasts roughly three 
years, then the direct cost of apprenticeship are estimated at FCFA 150,000. To this 
amount, the basic toolkit of future tailors must be added (scissors, tape measure, pens 
etc.). This is not only a plausible financial burden for apprentices and those who support 
them but also a substantial revenue for employers in our sample who sometimes hire up 
to 12 apprentices, thus rendering the qualification of their main activity ambiguous. Are 
they indeed “traditional” informal workshops or instead informal vocational training 
institutes? The ambiguity seems to be sometimes maintained on purpose by the 
entrepreneurs.  
 
Apprentices enjoy complementary benefits from their employer in a greater proportion 
than paid labourers (see table A.4. in the Appendix). More than half of them receive at 
least one complementary transfer, generally consisting of meal or seasonal premium. 
Some of them are also promised assistance in case of disease or accident occurring at 
work. Furthermore, more than 50 per cent of apprentices are allowed to use machines at 
the workplace to work on own account (sometimes even for their own clients) during 
temporary idle periods. This may explain the long time spent by apprentices in 
workshops: nine hours a day on average, six days a week. 

6
 A construction site can be stopped overnight if subcontractors are not paid in time.
QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS132 

9 
 
What is essential to understand about this peculiar arrangement, and notably about the 
legitimacy of paying such relatively large amounts, is the significance of the 
transmission of technical human capital, which is hard to objectify. Do workshop 
supervisors elaborate an explicit training plan for their apprentices? Here we rely on 
observations of the internal organisation of workshops completed during the survey. 
Most of them are confirmed by other evidence collected in West Africa on this topic 
(Inades. (1996); Morice, A. (1987); Grégoire, E. (1987); Marguerat, Y. (1996); Miras, 
C. (DE). (1980)). Our findings are unambiguous. The apprenticeship doesn’t follow any 
pre-existing explicit plan. It mainly consists of repeating practical operations shown by 
the employer. Despite the formality induced by the payment of fees, the imperatives of 
production always supersede training obligations. Among tailors, assembling pieces of 
fabric (e.g. sleeves to a shirt) or adding finishing touches to clothes (e.g. sewing 
buttons) are taught in early stages of the apprenticeship but it can take months to be 
initiated to cutting (the most important part of the production process) or to be allowed 
to perform the commercial tasks implied in a direct contact with clients. These 
operations are jealously monopolised by the employer or the most experienced tailors in 
the workshop. Upgrades in the process of learning seem to happen at a slow random 
pace. An important opportunity is offered when the apprentice’s immediate predecessor 
in the workshop quits the job or she/he is promoted. The follower then inherits the tasks 
previously performed by his/her elder. The most recent newcomer only performs tasks 
despised by others (sweeping, cleaning the machines, ironing etc.). The apprenticeship 
system, far from obeying a strict teaching calendar, is thus organised as a labour queue. 
Symptomatically “liberation” is the term used by young workers to qualify the 
completion of their apprenticeship, an event the timing of which entirely decided by the 
boss. Objective technical tests rarely support this decision, which then allows its 
instrumental manipulation by the employer7. Finally, the “certificate” delivered is 
generally not recognised as a valid diploma by formal authorities and consequently, has 
a value restricted to the area where the employer has gained a certain degree of 
reputation. 
 
The former arguments require formal treatment to actually test the validity of the 
Beckerian model of apprenticeship that inspires the category built by labour 
statisticians. This raises delicate methodological issues that we cannot solve in the 
present paper: how to quantify the cost of apprenticeship for employers? What is a 
reasonable length of learning period?8 What can at least be suggested here is that 
employers do not seem to bear obvious large costs in the process of training and that 
apprentices’ productivity, though probably low, may not necessarily be nil, thus 
justifying net transfers from young workers to their boss (and the application of the ILO 
categorisation). One could also argue that apprentices actually buy more than just 
technical competences, for example social capital within a particular business they don’t 
initially know. A rationale for explaining the particular set-up of the apprenticeship 

7
 The end of apprenticeship is a particularly critical moment in the professional career of tailors. Clashes 
with the employer are frequent when apprentices estimate that they have acquired sufficient skills to 
directly sell their production. 
8
 Some may also argue that evaluating the degree of generality of the human capital transferred can hardly 
be done (see Velenchik, A.D. (1995), pp. 451-75.). To us, in the context under review, the solution to this 
problem is fairly obvious: sewing a button or assembling schoolboy uniforms or male shirts are 
standardised tasks exclusively containing general human capital. This may hold for the majority of other 
informal activities producing standard goods or services. 
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system may require an examination of parental choices of time allocation of their 
children when school is not anymore a credible track to future income. Apprenticeship 
may well be a default option for school-leavers unconnected to the informal sector 
(Guichaoua, Y. (2005)).  
 
• Unpaid Labour 
As mentioned above, unpaid labour has been classified as a residual category. However, 
it has some remarkable features that allow a more positive depiction. Most unpaid 
labourers perceive a variety of, often bundled, benefits (see table A.4. in the Appendix). 
Monetary premia are more frequent than in any other category of labour. Even more 
striking, a vast majority of unpaid workers are offered in-kind benefits (meals and even 
housing) or protection against risks. In line with the above discussion, unpaid workers 
can be said to be maintained in an “illiquid” position but are compensated through tied 
transfers, ensuring the fulfilment of their basic needs. This is the sign of a paternalistic 
relationship.  
 
Like apprentices, unpaid workers have access to the machines of the workshop for their 
own account work. The scope of the tasks they perform is more extensive than that of 
apprentices. Unpaid workers spend on average more time in the workshop than their 
fee-paying counterparts (9.6 hours a day). This may again reflect their attachment to the 
household of their master. 
 
These characteristics of unpaid labour suggest that the labour transaction that has been 
observed is only one secondary aspect of the pre-existing relation that prevails between 
the worker and his/her boss. This relation, as the next section will show, is likely to be 
asymmetrical, based on personal dependence.   
 
Preliminary conclusion: the diversity of employment logics 
 
A careful analysis of employment arrangements prevailing in two sectors of the 
informal economy of Abidjan has permitted us to distinguish three particular 
arrangements. Paid labour seems to obey pure market logic as transactions are short-
term and standardised. What makes this professional status sustainable in the long term 
however is probably the access of workers to complementary informal consumption-
smoothing mechanisms. We have also identified an intriguing arrangement in the fee-
paying apprenticeship whose compatibility with a Beckerian on-the-job learning 
modelling is far from obvious. Finally, unpaid labour is a status probably embedded in a 
broader relation of personal dependence. This diversity of occupational situations, each 
of them being backed on particular - though not necessarily straightforward - logics and 
expectations (respectively: market transactions, skill acquisition and authoritarian 
labour mobilisation) contrasts with the ICSE view which orders labour relations around 
the single reference point of state-protected employment. How these various statuses are 
accessed is a further issue to which we will now turn our attention. 
 
 
III. Social ties and employment relationships 
 
From the previous section, it is argued that labour statuses are not randomly attributed 
to agents: unpaid labour may only be sustainable if consumption-smoothing 
mechanisms are available; fee-paying apprenticeships require external financial support; 
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and unpaid labour is likely to stem from pre-existing relations of personal dependence. 
In the absence of state regulation, social ties are expected to play a major role in the 
access to jobs. This section tries to define and evaluate this role. 
 
The survey reveals how each occupation has been initiated (see table 3. below). Five 
circumstances have been observed. Jobs have been obtained either through direct family 
channels (“employed by a parent”), indirect family channels (“parental 
intermediation”), friends’ intermediation, a pre-existing non-family tie (“already known 
employer”) or, finally, the anonymous spontaneous application. The first observation is 
that whatever the current labour status is, anonymous encounters are of minor 
importance. This should be stressed as it helps to characterise the sort of labour mobility 
that prevails within the informal sector: the typical market matching procedure is by no 
means dominant. On the contrary, socialised access to employment is the rule. Can we 
nuance the role of social ties in access to job? A practical distinction can be made 
between “family” and “friends”. The first type of social ties are assigned (inherited) 
while the second one are constructed (resulting from a progressive accumulation of 
social connections)9. A reasonable complementary hypothesis is that discretionary 
authority is more likely to be expressed within the family sphere10 and that, conversely, 
more equal peer relations should characterise friendship ties.  
 
What dominates among paid workers is a process of job access through constructed ties, 
i.e. persons living in the same neighbourhood or having the same profession. 
Reciprocity seems to be the principal rule of behaviour. Table A.8. in the Appendix 
shows that paid workers not only benefit from others’ recommendation but also 
contribute to promote the access to jobs of their friends. Paid workers are also the most 
prone to participate in ROSCAs or become a member of a village association11. It would 
be misleading however to consider the socialisation of paid workers as being purely 
symmetrical. Qualitative observations developed during the survey have identified a 
hybrid relationship, borrowing its logic both from the family regime and from the 
constructed social realm. This is the patron-client tie, i.e. “an asymmetrical, voluntary, 
and instrumental friendship in which non-comparable goods and services are exchanged 
for mutual benefit” (Tellis-Nayak, V. (1983), p. 67).12 
 
Whatever the degree of symmetry between the parties to the exchange, the evidence of 
strong social affiliations on the part of the majority of paid workers may, at least 
partially, contribute to solve the chronic economic vulnerability they face.  
 
Unsurprisingly, apprentices and unpaid workers are found to be family members (see 
table 3. and table A.8.). But the way the family affects the occupational spell of these 

9
 This differentiation may overlap Mark Granovetter’s dichotomy between “strong ties” and “weak ties” 
(Granovetter, M. (1973), pp. 1360-80.). But Granovetter uses this classification to trace flows of 
information circulating within a network. Here we rather stress the normative content of the social 
contacts used to gain access to job.
10
 Anthropologists have extensively documented the priority given to elders over juniors in West African 
societies (Abeles, M. and C. Collard. (1985)).
11
 Village associations have are immensely popular in Abidjan. Their initial purpose is to organise 
funerals but they are also mobilised to mediate conflicts or channel assistance toward one of its member 
in need. Vidal, C. (1991) and Vidal, C. (1995) forcefully point that this solidarity is pre-conditioned by 
continuous participation in the association and is not addressed to non-contributing village natives. 
12
 For close definitions of the patron-client tie, see also Balandier, G. (1969, pp. 345-49) and Platteau, J.-
P. (1995, pp. 767-86).
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two categories of workers differs. Parents of apprentices send their children to a 
workshop they don’t run themselves and pay a fee for this, whereas parents of unpaid 
workers tend to privilege an internal solution: they more frequently directly use their 
children. The strategies behind these decisions may also differ: apprentices explicitly 
want to acquire technical (and probably commercial) skills (and the puzzle remains: 
why do they accept this expensive arrangement?) whereas the labour mobilisation of 
unpaid workers is likely to conform to the common child-labour economic model where 
credit constraints force parents to withdraw their children from school (Baland, J.-M. 
and J.A. Robinson. (2000))13. In one case, parents seek to pursue the human capital 
acquisition of their children, in the other; they have no choice but to compel them to 
work. 
 
 
!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Circumstances of access to job Paid workers(n=115) Apprentices (n=60) Unpaid workers (n=47) 
Employed by a parent 19 8 43 
Parental intermediation 6 52 43 
Friends intermediation 25 20 7 
Already known employer 17 0 0 
Spontaneous application 
(unknown employer) 33 20 7 
 
 
These observations are confirmed by table 4 which presents the results of a multinomial 
logistic regression detailing the chances of being offered the status of paid worker rather 
than unpaid worker and apprentice rather than unpaid worker. Controlling for age, 
gender or nationality, being hired via a non-direct family channel systematically 
significantly increases the chances of not being an unpaid worker. Furthermore, non-
family ties are favoured by paid workers who also have smaller chances of being 
financially backed by their relatives.  
 
Associations between forms of socialisation and labour statuses are clearer now. Paid 
labour mostly relies on friendship ties entailing reciprocal exchanges. Apprenticeship 
and unpaid labour are mostly exerted under family auspices, with one difference 
however: the perspective of human capital acquisition is explicit in the apprenticeship 
arrangement whereas immediate economic needs are likely to explain unpaid labour. An 
additional indicator can be mobilised at this stage that measures the length of time 
required by workers to reach their workplace (assuming that they all use the same mode 
of transportation): unpaid workers reach their workshop in 20 minutes while it takes 
respectively 26 and 30 minutes on average to apprentices and paid workers to do the 
same journey. This spatial measure could proxy the size of the immediate social space 
to which each category belong and is coherent with our former observations: unpaid 
workers are probably those whose social spatial sphere is the smallest. 
 
An unintentional result of the socially regulated recruitment in the sectors we have 
researched is the polarisation by nationality across workplaces. Construction sites hire 

13
 Table A.6. on socio-demographic traits of workers and A.7. on their educational attainment could be 
compatible with this view: unpaid workers come from poorer more rural background and are less 
educated than apprentices.
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an average of 50 per cent of Ivorian workers. This figure reaches 67 per cent in the 
small garment industry. But, where the boss is an Ivorian national, this proportion rises 
up to 70 and 95 per cent in the construction sector and the small textile industry 
respectively. A symmetrical effect is observed when the employer is a foreigner: the 
percentage of Ivorian nationals among the workforce drops to 20 and 32 per cent in the 
construction sector and the small textile industry respectively.  
 
Labour allocation in the informal sector is socially regulated. This finding destroys the 
widespread view of developing countries metropolitan economies as lawless universes 
(Morduch, J. (1999)). Furthermore, each social space sustaining particular access to jobs 
has a normative behavioural content. Relying on friends implies reciprocal 
commitments within a restricted group of equals, while family labour allocation 
conveys a relation of authority. A question now remains which relates to the reciprocal 
permeability of the labour regimes we have identified and their sustainability over time. 
Can the different statuses be sequenced trajectories? In what order? We now need to 
direct attention towards the social mobility of informal workers. 
 
 
%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Labour status by circumstances of access to job (logit estimates) 
 paid labour vs. unpaid 
labour 
apprenticeship vs. unpaid 
labour 
Sex   
   Male 3,90 *** -1,85 *** 
   Female Ref. Ref. 
Age   
   22 and more -0,05 -0,78 
   Less than 22 Ref. Ref. 
Nationality   
   Ivoirian 0,43 -0,09 
   non-Ivorian Ref. Ref. 
Circumstances of access to job   
   Parental intermediation  -1,29 ** 2,17 *** 
   Friends intermediation or already known employer 2,26 *** 3,60 *** 
   Spontaneous application 2,71 *** 2,84 *** 
Employed by a parent Ref. Ref. 
Is a member of ROSCAs or village association   
   Yes 0,49 -0,38 
   No Ref. Ref. 
Receives transfers from family   
   Yes -1,61 *** 1,37 ** 
   No Ref. Ref. 
Intercept -3,28 ** -1,53 * 
R2 0,52 
Observations 220 
***
 : p-value under 0.01 ; ** : p-value under 0.05; * : p-value under 0.1 Ref.: category of reference 
 
 
IV. The family to networks transition and its theoretical implications 
 
Profiles of professional spells 
 
The field survey permits the ex-post reconstruction of the workers’ work experience 
since their entry into the labour force, or alternatively, since their definitive exit from 
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school. To allow the observation of an individual “workspan”, we restrict our attention 
to workers aged between 22 and 30, which leaves us with 95 observations (mostly 
concentrated in the construction sector as workers there tend to be older than in the 
small textile industry)14. We then consider their occupations on an annual basis between 
12 and 22 years of age. Figures 1. and 2. respectively show, year after year, the 
circumstances of workers’ access to job and status.  
 
 
Figure 1. Access to Employment form 12 to 22 
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Figure 2. Employment Status from 12 to 22 
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 Many of them didn’t enter the construction sector in the first place. Some of them, for example, have 
accumulated a working experience as farmers. 
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Logically, rates of idleness or school attendance are higher the younger individuals are 
and tend to decrease gradually as they get older. The progressive entry of agents into the 
labour force of agents is largely absorbed by family recruitment of labour whatever the 
age of the new entrant. A corollary is that unpaid labour is the most common labour 
status until later ages. But figures 1. and 2. don’t exactly coincide. Family-oriented 
access to jobs remains high whatever the age of agents, but the incidence of unpaid 
labour tends to decrease as workers grow older, carrying the implication that family 
arrangements have a certain degree of flexibility and can actually include a monetary 
transfer. Not surprisingly, and confirming our previous hypothesis on the progressive 
accumulation of non-family social connections, friendship ties intervene in access to 
jobs at a rather late stage (around the age of 17) and coincide with the increasing 
incidence of paid labour. Anonymous encounters on the labour market are 
systematically marginal.  
 
This evidence suggests the existence of two dynamic processes: i) the transformation of 
family ties affecting labour relationships through a probable softening of the authority 
of the parents on their children; ii) the progressive acquisition of non-family ties and 
their conversion into useful relationships through which to gain access to remunerated 
jobs. These processes however shouldn’t be considered as linear. Trajectories in the 
informal sector are very unstable and may be temporarily interrupted not only by job 
losses but also, as reported by our respondents, by accidents, thefts, diseases or 
unwanted pregnancies. Being “downgraded” is also a possibility: a rural paid worker 
migrating to town may be compelled to work for his/her host while waiting for a more 
rewarding job opportunity. However, this delay may also be used to make social 
connections in a new geographical space.  
 
The Microeconomics of informal labour arrangements 
 
Family and friends are the two main channels through which the workers of our survey 
gain access to job. How is the discipline of economics equipped to treat such situations? 
 
Since Becker’s seminal work, economics has developed a long tradition of analysis of 
intrafamily consumption choices from which most of the literature on child labour 
stems (Jacoby, H.G. and E. Skoufias. (1997); Baland, J.-M. and J.A. Robinson. (2000)). 
This strand of literature may be particularly useful in this context, where workers are 
still very young. It may certainly provide insights in explaining why some of the 
households of our survey don’t send their children to school. The use of unitary models, 
though violating the principle of methodological individualism (Chiappori, P.-A. 
(1988)), doesn’t necessarily hinder the accurate modelling of the phenomenon since, as 
we have shown, non-contestable authority is sometimes used to force children to work. 
Whereas gender relationships within households are now systematically treated in a 
game-theoretical framework, the modelling of intergenerational issues, like child labour, 
still pertinently mobilise an unitary framework where the head of the household “has the 
last word” (Ben-Porath, Y. (1982)).  
 
How about recommendations between friends? Here we deliberately ignore the 
literature on referrals on the labour markets of industrial economies (Montgomery, J.D. 
(1991)) which mainly derives explanations from the employer’s point of view: 
asymmetries of information are minimised when new personnel are recommended by an 
insider. What we observe in the context of Abidjan is the self-organisation of chains of 
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recommendation within a group of workers as a way to maximise the chances of 
individuals avoiding a temporary loss of income. Those who share information on job 
opportunities are also likely to set up ROSCAs or belong to a common village 
association. Risk-sharing models are adequate to diagnose these particular practices, 
which, our case study shows, can be observed in urban settings. Most of these models 
(Coate, S. and M. Ravallion. (1993); Ligon, E., J.P. Thomas, and T. Worrall. (2002); 
Dercon, S. (2003)) consider risk-sharing mechanisms as being the result of a self-
interested calculus performed by perfectly rational agents, holding symmetrical 
positions. This framework may fit with decisions taken within networks or groups of 
equals.  
 
However, this rapid overview of economic models pertinent to our case study is not 
entirely satisfactory as they concern two static polar forms of individuals’ socialisation: 
pure hierarchical relations in the first series of models, and pure symmetrical exchanges 
in the second. What happens in between? What our glance at the occupational 
trajectories of workers has shown is the progressive, though not linear, replacement 
over time of authoritarian labour mobilisation by forms of access to jobs through 
friendship ties. How could this change be theoretically accounted for? One possibility is 
certainly to pay greater attention to the cognitive processes that may transform a child, 
limited in his/her capacity to take decision into a fully rational homo oeconomicus. But 
the acquisition of agentic capacity may not be theoretically adequate as objective 
constraints may prevent individuals from exploiting it. A less ambitious possibility 
consists of empirically identifying intermediate forms of socialisation. In this respect, as 
we have argued above, patron-client ties may well be a stylised middle point between 
the authoritarian family realm and the network of friends. These ties are asymmetrical 
but are also chosen and may simultaneously represent an opportunity to challenge the 
family’s authority and an entry point into business relations permitting access to cash. 
 
 
V. Concluding remarks 
 
The present paper is mainly an empirical account of labour relationships in the urban 
informal sector of West Africa. It has firstly attempted to build a typology of 
employment relationships, not referring to the dominant model of state-protected jobs. 
Various alternative sets of norms can actually frame employment relationships in a 
sector where, by definition, official authorities have minor influence. Among these 
norms are family rules of labour recruitment or principles of reciprocal exchange within 
socially constructed networks. The high frequency of these behavioural rules confirms 
that the informal sector can by no means be considered a realm of pure market 
transactions. Current official classifications, and notably the ICSE, should acknowledge 
the plurality of norms prevailing in the informal sector. Forms of payment or pre-
existing social proximity between the parties could be criteria to identify these norms. 
This could help to build a positive categorisation of non state-protected labour 
arrangements, thus filling in the “informal” vacuum. It could also give insights into 
what the professional prospects of workers could be as current arrangements affect the 
way a career is pursued: for example, an authoritarian relationship comprising small in-
kind transfers might obliterate the chances a worker has to accumulate a start-up capital. 
On the contrary, frequent access to cash through spot transactions facilitates the 
possibility of future investment. 
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We have also attempted to see how the various categories can evolve over time. 
Logically and historically, intrafamily labour mobilisation is found to be anterior to 
access to jobs through friendship ties. This has led us to discuss the capacity of existing 
economic models to capture this very dynamic process. Unitary models of intrafamily 
decision and risk-sharing models may only be valid to respectively describe the original 
and final ends of an informal trajectory as a dependent labourer. Greater attention needs 
to be paid to plausible intermediary situations, the patron-client tie probably being one 
of them. 


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APPENDIX 
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 1981 1984 1987 1992 
 freq. ind. freq. ind. freq. ind. freq. ind. 
Food industry 40372 100 37367 92 27824 69 24755 61 
Textile 11470 100 5112 45 6134 53 8120 71 
Chemical and oil industry 11767 100 13537 115 15204 129 14230 121 
Construction and public works 22891 100 8023 34 3016 13 2698 12 
Source : Cellule emploi ORSTOM-ENSEA. (1996) 
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 Construction (n=105) Couture (n=121) 
Paid workers 103 16 
Apprentices 0 60 
Unpaid workers 2 45 
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 Mean Median 
Daily workers (n=83) 1750 1500 
    « simples » tasks (n=62) 1500 1500 
    « complex » tasks (n=21) 2400 2500 
Monthly workers (n=13) 50000 50000 
    « simple » tasks (n=1) 45000 - 
    « complex » tasks (n=12) 50400 50000 
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 Paid workers 
(n=119) 
Apprentices 
(n=60) 
Unpaid workers 
(n=47) 
Monetary premium 1 13 38 
In kind premium 0 5 17 
Contribution to lunch expenses 17 35 79 
Contribution to transportation costs 6 8 15 
Assistance if disease or accident when 
working 21 23 57 
Loans/cash advance 17 12 6 
Housing 4 7 23 
No complementary transfer 55 46 7 
Package of at least two of the above transfers 14 30 73 
 
Notes on Table A.4. 
• Monetary premiums are distributed when activity reaches seasonal peaks i.e. at the beginning of a new school 
year in September, or during religious festivities. They hardly amount to FCFA 1000. In kind premiums are 
small gifts, often clothes. Monetary and in kind premiums are not part of an explicit policy of incentives; they 
remain the discretionary initiative of the boss. They just compensate for the additional effort seasonally required 
from workers. 
• Most of the employees and workers of Abidjan work far from home thus necessitating transportation and lunch 
expenses. Employers sometimes contribute to these expenses, for small amounts (less than FCFA 300) that can 
hardly be considered as monetary transfers. 
• Accommodation is a particular in kind benefit offered by employers. It generally reflects a strong paternalistic 
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tie. It doesn’t necessarily entail living with the boss. Some workshops are set up in a way that enables one 
employee to live there. 
• Assistance in case of disease or accident is by no means an explicit commitment by the boss. It rather stems 
from his « generosity ». Moreover, as the question has been asked here to the employee, the answers reflect 
more the belief in this generosity than the actual disposition of the boss to enact this assistance. 
• Loans or cash advance are a very sensitive issue in the context of Abidjan where the lack of cash chronically hits 
most of the population. Many formal firms actually pay their employees in two instalments, the first of them 
being a cash advance dispensed halfway of the month (Bazin, L. and R.Y. Gnabéli. (1996)). 
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Paid workers 
(n=119) 
Apprentices 
(n=60) 
Unpaid workers 
(n=47) 
Number of working days 
(mean) 
6  
(0,65) 
6  
(0,3) 
6  
(0,3) 
Number of daily working 
hours (mean) 
8,5  
(1,21) 
9  
(1,33) 
9,6  
(1,49) 
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  Paid workers 
(n=119) 
Apprentices 
(n=60) 
Unpaid workers 
(n=47) 
Percentage of women 1 76 36 
Mean age (years) 25,6 19,8 19,9 
Born in Abidjan (per cent) 28 40 30 
Ivorian nationality (per cent) 62 73 62 
Father’s occupation* (per cent)    
   self-employed 34 32 28 
   farmer 38 10 36 
   formal employee  25 52 30 
Religion (per cent)    
   Christian 34 67 38 
   Muslim 51 23 53 
*some values are missing 
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  Paid workers 
(n=119) 
Apprentices 
(n=60) 
Unpaid workers 
(n=47) 
Highest educational « cycle » attained 
None 14 14 13 
Coranic school/ « franco-
arabe » 10 5 19 
Primary 51 49 57 
Secondary and above 25 32 11 
Mean age when leaving school 
 14,1 14,5 13 
Main reason for leaving school (per cent) 
Bad results 24 42 46 
Lack of money 55 29 29 
Accident/disease 17 2 17 
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Paid 
workers 
(n=119) 
Apprentices 
(n=60) 
Unpaid 
workers 
(n=47) 
Pays some housing expenses 53 3 4 
Runs a secondary inc. generating act. 43 38 43 
Receives transfers from family 11 90 62 
Is a member of a village ass., ROSCA… 48 30 38 
Has helped some friends to get a job through 
referral 46 0 5 
 
 
